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Abstract
This thesis analyzes the cost associated with the Minuteman III (MM III) weapon
system. The research develops three models for determining MM III costs per alert hour
(CPAH). The first model is based on the Air Force Cost Analysis Improvement Group
cost per flying hour model. The model is modified to include depot level reparables,
consumables, and personnel costs. The second model is based on the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, Cost Analysis Improvement Group cost per flying hour model and
is formulated using service-wide data from the Air Force Total Ownership Cost tool. The
third model is a comprehensive model including indirect costs associated the ICBMsupporting installations.
Additionally, this thesis includes a CPAH for each echelon or level of
management for the MM III. As expected, the costs to operate the weapon system
increase as more functions are included at each level of management. The data reveals a
relatively small marginal CPAH at the lowest levels. However, due to the robust support
structure for the MM III, the models reveal significant fixed alert-hour costs. Finally, the
thesis discusses the workings of the MM III cost structure that may benefit future
budgeting decisions. Specifically, the step functions associated with each level of
management and the large fixed costs. This thesis presents the three models as a starting
point for developing a CPAH predictive model in future research.
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MINUTEMAN III COST PER ALERT HOUR ANALYSIS
I. Introduction
“Deterrence can be limited and simple or, as it turned out, expansive and complex.”
Hans M. Kristensen-director of Nuclear Information Project
General Issue
Why study intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) cost per alert hour (CPAH)?
The September 2008 Report of the Secretary of Defense Task Force on DOD Nuclear
Weapons Management, more commonly known as the Schlesinger Report identified
many shortcomings of the nuclear community and laid the groundwork to bolster the
defense community’s understanding of the enterprise. A part of this encompassing effort
was to create a deeper understanding of the nuclear enterprise workings. One such
vehicle is an advanced academic degree from the Air Force Institute of Technology
(AFIT) focusing on the nuclear enterprise and how it relates to logistics and supply chain
management. An integral part of the degree is a collaborative thesis with experts in the
field in focused areas needing additional research. These above situations have
culminated in the need for a deeper understanding of the nuclear enterprise, which is
addressed in part by understanding the cost factors associated with keeping our
Minuteman III (MM III) missiles on alert. Mr. Michael Donley, Secretary of the Air
Force, and General Norton Schwartz, Air Force Chief of Staff, have identified Nuclear
Deterrence Operations as the first of twelve “Air Force Core Functions.” Within this
core function are three elements, two of which are directly relate to the costs of
maintaining and operating our ICBMs: upgrading the MM III system and replacing the
1

UH-1N helicopters that fly in the missile complexes (SAF/FM, 2011:34). The stated
objective is to maintain the current ICBM force through 2030. With the historical O&M
and military personnel increases in cost (see Figure 1), it is imperative to ensure that
keeping our ICBMs viable can be obtained within the given budget.

Figure 1: ICBM O&M and Military Personnel Costs (in millions) (AFTOC, 2012)

ICBM procurement and sustainment have always been complex endeavors. Neil
Sheehan describes the political and commercial influences of the early missile
developments in his biographical-novel about Bernard Schriever’s foundational work on
the ICBM enterprise (Sheehan, 2009). The complexity has continued into the current
missile support structure. Much of the complexity is inherent due to the size of the
weapon system (WS); moreover, some complexity is present by design for security
reasons. Lastly, as with any large program, there are likely some areas that should be
streamlined.
All figures for this thesis are based on fiscal year 2011 (FY11) figures unless
otherwise stated. Historical figures have been converted from “then year dollars” to
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FY11 dollars to account for inflation. The 2011 budget for the entire Air Force was
170.78 billion dollars. Within this overall budget was the major category of O&M or
readiness that comprised 26.8% or 45.79 billion dollars of the AF total budget. The
readiness portion contains the costs to operate and maintain the Air Force’s weapon
systems and by extension, the 4.8 billion dollars calculated in the active duty cost per
flying hour (CPFH) program (SAF/FM, 2011:21). The Air Force uses CPFH models for
the majority of its weapons systems and has the goal to develop a CPFH model for every
system. The current CPFH model has been shown to be accurate for only a narrow range
of circumstances and that more robust models exists (Laubacher, 2004:64). The Air
Force has continued with its current model for decades, partially because the
effectiveness of alternative models has not been communicated to decision makers
(Armstrong, 2006:1)
The cost associated with operating a weapon system is quiet complex. Different
bases, major commands (MAJCOMs), the Air Force Cost Analysis Improvement Group
(AFCAIG) and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Cost Analysis Group (OSD
CAIG) have different methods of interpreting nuances when calculating a weapon
system’s CPFH. Moreover, some detail is blurred as data is aggregated at each level.
ICBM cost-data are just as complicated as other weapon systems, possibly more so given
their unique support attributes. The missile alone is not operational; it requires a silo,
launch equipment, support equipment, personnel, and communication platforms to
function. The system in its entirety is called WS-133A/M and includes the many
elements shown in Figure 2. This thesis is focused on the costs most directly attributable
to the actual missiles and peripheral equipment. The MM III weapon system mission
3

design (MD) is LGM-30 and is outlined in Figure 2. The mission design series (MDS) is
LGM-30G, but there is only one MDS currently operational within the MD, so this thesis
will use LGM-30 throughout.

LGM-30

Figure 2: LGM-30 vs. WS-133A/M (GTE, 1980)
Some of the other items can be readily added to the cost of a missile, for example
the calculated CPFH for the support helicopters, the UH-1N, is $11,703 (AFCAIG,
2011). The helicopters’ primary mission is supporting the MM IIIs. However, other
systems that support MM III operations such as communication satellites are used by
many other systems and the satellites cannot accurately be added to the MM III cost to
operate. Ideally, one would be able to assess every system that supports a MM III to any
4

degree, find the percentage of that support, and the costs of operating each supporting
system. Such an endeavor would be virtually unmanageable in scope and definition.
Thus, the scope of this thesis focuses on the costs associated with the LGM-30 instead of
the WS-133A/M.
Implications
This study (and subsequent follow-on analyses) may aid in future ICBM
structuring. In strategic guidance released January 2012, President Obama and Defense
Secretary Leon Panetta state: "It is possible that our deterrence goals can be achieved
with a smaller nuclear force, which would reduce the number of nuclear weapons in our
inventory as well as their role in U.S. national security strategy" (DOD, 2012:5). The
future budget environment may lead policy makers to decide to reduce the overall costs
incurred by our ICBM force. As will be shown, closing one launch facility (LF) by
taking one missile off-line would not reduce the overall cost. In fact, removing one
missile can actually increase cost due to the inherent dependency of the sub-systems and
increased maintenance visits. To reduce significantly the cost of maintaining the sites, an
entire squadron of 50 missiles would need to be taken off-line (Harlow, 2011). A
squadron closure is a strategic decision more than an economic decision. For example, it
may be more cost effective to close a base and concentrate ICBMs at one location; yet it
may be strategically necessary to maintain a dispersed presence. There are international
implications when dealing with such a large deactivation. Therefore, it is not within the
scope of this thesis to suppose any recommendations on reductions in force structure.
Rather, this thesis will look at the costs that can be attributed to operating an ICBM at the

5

lowest level (LF) and compare those costs with the costs of operating larger groups of
missiles at higher echelons. There are necessary costs incurred at the higher levels of
management that do not directly affect the missiles, yet the costs are required at those
levels. An example is the quality of life items at a base. A base dining facility is not a
direct part of launching a MM III. However, the personnel needed to support the system
must eat. Therefore, the dining facility is an additional cost that does not directly go into
the cost of maintaining a silo, but does affect the costs of maintaining an ICBM wing.
Problem Statement
This thesis seeks to analyze the costs of operating a LF and determine how the
CPAH model changes as higher levels of management are incorporated into the model.
Research Questions
1. Can the Air Force Cost Analysis Improvement Group (AFCAIG) and Office
of the Secretary of Defense, Cost Analysis Improvement Group (OSD CAIG)
aircraft cost per flying hour models be used to develop cost per alert hour
models for the LGM-30 weapon system? If so, what are the differences?
2. Do cost per alert hour factors change significantly based on the level of
management?
3. What cost drivers should be included in developing a comprehensive CPAH
model for the LGM-30 weapon system?
4. What is the relationship of costs and alert hours?

6

Summary
This thesis develops the above ideas in Chapter II by providing a review of past
CPFH research along with related concepts such as AFCAIG and OSD CAIG cost
categories and ICBM specific attributes. Chapter III builds upon the prior literature and
develops three models for determining ICBM CPAH figures. The first is based on
AFGAIG elements, the second is based on OSD CAIG elements, and the final model is a
unique comprehensive look at ICBM cost. In Chapter IV, the author presents the analysis
of the data. Finally, Chapter V includes a summary of the results and provides a brief
description of the possible implications of the models. The thesis concludes with
recommendations for future analyses and research efforts.

7

II. Literature Review
Chapter Overview
This chapter first looks at the general mechanics of a cost per flying hour (CPFH)
program. Next, applications from the commercial sector are related to the flying hour
program. Then, this chapter expands the workings of the Air Force’s CPFH program by
reviewing examples of how the flying hour program has been used recently. Next, an
example of a non-traditional cost per flying hour assessment is reviewed. Finally, this
chapter reviews elements that are specific to the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM)
mission, including funding history (an insourcing versus outsourcing decision), force
structure, and other aspects of the weapon system (WS) that relate to how much it costs
to operate per hour.
The Cost per Flying Hour Program
The CPFH idea dates back as far as 1962 (Kimbrough, 2003:10). The focus on
managing a CPFH program was brought the forefront by Air Force costs analyst during
the early 1990s as Cold War budgeting practices changed and the Defense Management
Review called for more budget justifications (Rose, 1997:5).
The basic flying hour (FH) program is based on the Operation and Maintenance
(O&M) costs for a particular mission design series (MDS). The O&M cost have
increased at a faster rate, accounting for an increasingly larger portion of the budget
(Defense, 2006). Increased O&M costs mean other areas such as research, development,
and modernization efforts reduce proportionally to the budget. The FH program
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proportional relationship is defined as one where no costs are incurred if zero hours are
flown and a 1% increase in hours results in a 1% increase in costs (Van Dyk, 2008:1).
However, as the budget has increased, the actual number of hours flown has decreased,
(see Figure 3).

Figure 3: Rising Cost of O&M per Flying Hour (Defense, 2006)
The basic FH program uses a proportional model comprised of the expected
number of hours to be flown multiplied times a CPFH factor. The product is an estimate
for the FH program budget for the subsequent year. The model will be slightly modified
based on unique situations, but the basic model follows the structure shown in Figure 4
(SAF/FMC, 2005:18).

9

Projected
Flying Hours

X

Projected
CPFH Factor

=

FH Program
Budget

Figure 4: Basic CPFH Model, (SAF/FMC, 2005:18)
A GAO report highlighted the inaccuracies of using a cost per flying hour model
as a predictor of expected cost for a given year (GAO, 2000:1). Additionally, Armstrong
found that FH predictive models to have errors as large as 25% of the total flying-hour
program budget (Armstrong, 2006:iv). In efforts to improve the program, the Air Force
has progressed through multiple iterations of the CPFH methodology. In the late 1990s,
the Air Force was repeatedly flying fewer hours than were budgeted (GAO, 2000:2).
Flying units were expending the allotted funds before the budgeted (expected) hours were
flown. The result necessitated grounding aircraft or soliciting congress for more funds.
To increase accuracy in the program, each major command (MAJCOM) initiated a new
process that calculated the number of expected flying hours based on the number of pilots
needed for the assigned missions and training (Hess, 2009:18). The new method has
increased the steady-state (peacetime or baseline) projected flying hours; hours for
contingency operations are budgeted separately (SAF/FM, 2011:8). The other major
element to the basic model is the CPFH factor.
The CPFH factor, as described by the Air Force Cost Analysis Improvement
Group (AFCAIG) for aviation, includes 1) Materiel Support Division (MSD) managed
Depot Level Reparables (DLRs) and consumable spares, 2) consumable supplies
procured via the General Support Division (GSD) and the Government Purchase Card
(GPC), and 3) aviation fuel. Another iteration of the FH program took place in 2008
when the Air Force switched from allowing each MAJCOM to develop the above factors
10

used in computing a CPFH for a MDS. The factors are now developed by the
Centralized Asset Management (CAM) office for each MDS.
The DLR costs include some overhead costs; thus, the CPFH includes some fixed
cost and is not a solely variable cost metric. The MSD and GSD items number in the
hundreds and thousands respectively. Each item is individually forecasted for demand
and expected cost by collecting two years of demand data and dividing it through the
number of flying hours over the same period (Hess, 2009:19). The total of all those
forecast are compiled at the weapon system level by the CAM office. The Spares
Requirement Review Board projects the demand for each item, including adjustments for
unique situations such as planned maintenance and warranties. The final demand is
multiplied by the projected price of each part; however, the projected price of the parts
has been known to fluctuate significantly throughout the year (Kirby, 2010). There are
also some savings from bulk purchases that are not reflected in this calculation. The
result can (at times) be over or under budgeting the cost of parts needed for the upcoming
year. When there is a surplus of money for a specific part, it is redistributed to other parts
that may be under budgeted (Kirby, 2010). The fluctuation in part-costs, unexpected
maintenance costs, and the interaction of fixed costs with a per-hour measurement create
inaccuracies in the FH program (Rose, 1997:8). There is significantly less fluctuation
with the consumables factor. Consumables are calculated using three years historical
data, then normalized for inflation and total hours flown (Hess, 2009:20). Beyond the
basic three elements discussed above, previous literature has proposed numerous
alternatives (see Table 1). Some of the factors that could relate to the ICBM mission are
discussed in the next section.
11
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Table 1: Alternative CPFH Factors

Operations/Support Costs
Number of Parts Replacements
Maintenance Work Hours
Net Flying Costs
CPFH Factor
Flying Hours
Lagged Cost
Aircraft Age
Average Total Operating Hours
Flyaway Cost
IOC Year
Aircraft Type
MAJCOM
Percent Engine Type
Percent Block
Sorties
Average Sortie Duration
Utilization Rate
Mission Capable Rate
Cannibilization Rate
Deployments
Ground Days
Total Aircraft Inventory
Program Change
Base Location
Petroleum Proximity
Temperature
Dew Point
Month/Seasonality
Constract Support
Personnel Costs

Dependent Factors
X
X
X
X
X

X
X

Independent Factors
X
X
X
X
X

X

X
X
X

X
X

X

X
X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X
X

X

X

X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X

X

X
X
X

X

X

X

X

X

X
X

X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X

X

X
X
X
X
X

The inaccuracy of the basic CPFH model has been highlighted by historic surges
and lulls in flying hours. If the costs per flying hour model were relatively accurate, one
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would expect the cost to increase and decrease linearly with the number of hours flown.
For example, during contingency operations such as Operation Desert Storm and Kosovo
Air Campaign, many of our airframes saw increased flying hours that were not budgeted
for in the previous year. Wallace, Houser, and Lee found that when the CPFH model was
used to estimate maintenance costs for the increased hours, the C-5Bs had a predicted
demand for parts of over 200% of actual parts demanded (Wallace et al, 2000:1-2).
Their model was validated with KC-10, F-16C, and C-17 data from Kosovo that overestimated the cost of increasing the number of hours flown. The reason the costs did not
increase linearly has been debated. The researchers proposed a model including three
failure modes: dormant, cycle induced, and operations based. They conclude that the
most accurate model includes the proportion of time each MDS spends in one of the three
identified states (Wallace et al, 2000:2-2). Aircraft experience more failures in relation to
takeoff and landing counts than in relation to the hours flown, especially heavier aircraft
(Slay and Sherbrooke, 2000:1-1). Therefore, a model that is solely based on flying hours
will overestimate the maintenance cost for hours accumulated with longer sorties (Slay
and Sherbrooke, 2000, 1-2). One reason the per-hour costs decrease (increase at a lower
rate than hours flown) with increased sortie durations (and fewer sorties), relates to the
combinations of failure types. Ebeling describes five different methods of inducing a
failure (Ebeling, 2009:50)
-

Hourly operation time
Operating cycles
Clock time
Failures on demand
Maintenance-induced failures

13

For a CPFH model to accurately predict maintenance cost, failures would need to
primarily occur from hourly operation time and total clock time. Dawson and Howe
looked into the average sortie duration (ASD) in relation to an aircraft’s CPFH and found
that the longer duration flights serve to decrease CPFH (Dawson, 2006:22). Their
observation is that aircraft experience higher rates of failure on demand. Meaning, the
aircraft are more likely to fail (experience a scenario where a maintenance action is
required and a maintenance cost is incurred) when they go through the sortie process as
opposed to increasing the sortie duration. For example, two sorties of one hour each will
cost more than one two-hour sortie.
The Air Force has recognized the influence of age on the cost of maintaining our
weapon systems (Schwartz, 2011:7). The failure modes identified by Ebeling are critical
for ICBMs, because missile maintainers state that LGM-30s are a system with significant
effects of aging manifesting (Doyle, 2012). As a system ages, the O&M costs for that
system increase exponentially (Unger, 2008:24). In an interview with missile
maintainers, they described the maintenance rates of the MM III weapon system
components as also experiencing failure upon demand (Doyle, 2012). Together, the
components utilized during a maintenance action create an increasing rate of
maintenance-induced failures. The maintenance-induced failures do not mean that the
maintenance teams are haphazardly breaking components. Rather, a component that is
functioning while undisturbed may fail once it is removed to access a deeper component,
replaced, and tested. The Air Force has sought to mitigate the increasing maintenance
cost of our aging systems through a series of recapitalization and modernization
initiatives (Schwartz, 2011). However, in addition the actual costs of the initiatives, the
14

replaced parts must have a significantly higher reliability to justify replacing the part
versus dealing with increasing repair costs (Ebeling, 2009:265). Some components
designed as part of modernization efforts actually have experienced lower reliability rates
than the original components (Doyle, 2012 and Lorenz, 2011). Certainly, the goal is to
have components that meet the stringent reliability thresholds, and many of the ICBM
components do achieve the needed reliability rates (Lorenz, 2011). Unfortunately, a
single item with a relatively high failure rate can spawn more maintenance visits and
increase the likelihood of maintenance induced failures.

Figure 5: Bathtub Curve (Ebeling, 2009:31)
A concern with the introduction of new parts is failures from burn-in. A common
model for visualizing lifetime failure rates is the bathtub curve as shown in Figure 5
(Ebeling, 2009:31). Many CPFH rates for Air Force MDS follow a bathtub curve
(Hawkes and White, 2008:15). Not all MDS have been shown empirically to follow this
curve; some systems have linearly increasing failure rates (Hildebrandt and Sze,
1990:23). The burn-in failure rates of new components (either replacement or
modifications) can be compounded by the age of the system (Unger, 2008:31). Consider
15

the conceptual bathtub curve presented in Figure 5. Then, imagine that in addition to the
given parameters, new items with burn-in rates are added on the right side after the
system already has an increasing failure rate. The added burn-in failures can make the
observed failure rate increase exponentially. The failure rates would then be
compounded by the end of service life failures, for both a bathtub curve and a linearly
increasing failure rate (Hildebrandt and Sze, 1990:21).
Related Applications from the Commercial Sector
The CPFH metric is a per-unit measurement; similar metrics are used throughout
the commercial sector (Kaplan and Cooper, 1998:15). The trouble is that a per-unit
measurement provides a false sense of costs distributions. For example, if a factory is
producing 100 items and the total operating cost is $1000, the temptation is to believe
that it cost $10 to make one item. However, an Activity Based Costing (ABC) analysis
may reveal excess capacity and show that the factory could produce 200 items without a
two-fold cost increase. ABC seeks to find out how much it cost to complete a specific
activity such as paint widgets, package widgets, etc. Once all the activity costs are
totaled, a more accurate picture is obtained about the costs of producing the items.
Taking the example further, if sales are slow and they only sell half as many items, the
per-unit cost allocation would say that it now cost $20 to produce the items when the
actual cost of producing one item did not significantly change. Additionally, if the
factory produces half as many items, not all per-unit costs are recouped (Lambert,
2008:44). Lambert describes the importance of accurately capturing the effect of
reducing the number of items produced with what he calls “segment profitability.”
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Without the key enablers of segment profitability: data availability, data accuracy, and
state of the art system capabilities, a company [or government entity] will not know the
implications of a production change (Lambert, 2008:48). For the ICBM community, this
means that a cost increase per missile may be the result of cost increases of required
activities. The apparent cost increase may also occur because the number of missiles was
reduced (with costs staying relatively the same) or a combination of the two situations.
Chapter III and IV of this thesis provide an analysis as which scenario seems to be
occurring with the LGM-30.
ABC examples in the military
“The ability to forecast accurately starts at the lowest level possible; this is the
wing/base level in the USAF” (Armstrong, 2006:2). Furthermore, a true ABC model
would start at the root action and determine a cost for that action. A macro example is
looking at the many functions or activities performed by the DOD. The cost of National
Defense is often equated to the budget of the entire DOD. However, the DOD completes
other activities including “nation-building, policing foreign nations, humanitarian
missions and ferrying executive and legislative-branch leaders and their attendants
around the globe” (Factor, 2011:1). Such activities do not directly contribute to war
fighting capabilities; rather they are more a function of our foreign policy. The Marines
implemented many ABC initiatives in the late 1990s. One key element they identified
was the ability to ensure multiple systems are able to communicate the associated cost of
an activity (Chadwick, 2007:3).
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Activity Based Costing has been used in the Navy as well. In 1999 and 2000, the
Navy spent about $100,000 and 6 months implementing ABC at the Naval Air Depot in
Jacksonville, Florida. The revamped processes revealed that only 51 of 213 activities
added value to the repair process. The activities were reduced to 66 activities with an
annual savings of $200 million (Dekker, 2003). Fully implementing ABC requires the
organization to be committed to the entire process. An ABC undertaking is beyond the
scope of a thesis, however, it is beneficial to see how such a transformation has been used
in other military settings and could feasibly be implemented for base-level support to the
Minuteman III weapon system.
Recent CPFH Examples.
Most CPFH analyses involve efforts to develop more accurate CPFH models (see
Table 1). To develop stronger models, the researchers try to identify more accurate
predictors or input variables (Armstrong, 2006:12). Dr. David Lee proposed a physicsbased model including take-off/landing cycles, ground hours, and flying-hour variables
(Wallace, 2000:2-1). Some of the suggested models have outperformed the current
models and others have only marginally varied from the current AFCAIG model.
Nonetheless, the proposed models have not been widely incorporated into the AFCAIG
process (Van Dyk, 2008:4).
Figure 6 shows how the AFCAIG elements used to develop the AFCAIG CPFH
model can be considered a subset of the more comprehensive OSD CAIG elements. The
ODS CAIG elements changed in 2008 from seven items to the six items shown below
(AFTOC, 2012). The new OSD CAIG cost elements are calculated by including the
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AFCAIG items, plus AFI 65-503 Logistics Cost Factors, plus other cost elements such as
mission personnel, contractor support, sustaining support and indirect support.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Unit Personnel
Unit Operations
Maintenance
Sustaining Support
Continuing System Improvements
Indirect Support
OPERATING COST, OSD
CAIG CPFH

Reparable Parts
+
Consumable Parts
+
Aviation Fuel
= AFCAIG COST PER
FLYING HOUR

AFI 65-503 LOGISTIC
COST FACTORS
AFCAIG Elements
+
Other Cost Elements:
+
Misison Personnel, Nonfly Unit Level Supplies,
Depot Purchased
Contractor Support,
Equipment, Depot Level Sustaining Support, and
Maintenanc, etc.
Indirect Support
= AFI 65-503 LOGISTICS
COST FACTORS

= OPERATING COST,
OSD CAIG CPFH

+

Modification Costs

= Total OWNWERSHIP
COST

Figure 6: Increasing Factors Considered in AFCAIG and OSD CAIG
CPFH Models (Kirby, 2011)
The AFTOC tool gathers the data used to compute the models from numerous
sources (see Table 2) and allocates the costs based on the AFTOC business rules (Kirby,
2012:2). All the aforementioned factors comprise the weapon system operating costs;
modification costs are added to the operating cost to obtain the ownership cost (Kirby,
2012:4).
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Table 2: AFTOC Data Sources
•Financial
•Supply
–GAFS-R
–SBSS
–ABIDES
–DO35K
–IDECS
–DO43
–TWCF
–AFLMA
•Maintenance
–GCSS-AF
–FAS
•Munitions
–REMIS
–CAS
–Training
Munitions
•Personnel
•Factors
–E300Z
–AFI 65-503
Non-traditional CPFH Example
Some weapon systems do not readily conform to the AFCAIG CPFH model and
the OSD CAIG Operation and Ownership models (as shown in Figure 4). If the AFCAIG
model must be modified, by extension, the OSD CAIG model will be slightly different.
For example, a thesis by Kimbrough analyzed the factors that best suit two satellite MDS
(2004:6). He looked at costs that comprise the majority of the O&M phase of the Global
Positioning System (GPS) and the Military Strategic and Tactical Relay Satellite System
(MILSTAR). He focused on manpower variables, given that they comprised about 75%
of the O&M costs of the satellites. Where the traditional AFCAIG model uses aviation
fuel, DLRs, and consumables, Kimbrough’s model used Critical Space Contract
Operations, Critical Space Operations—Direct Support, and DLR—Non-Flying
(Kimbrough, 2004:34). The model’s predictive power was primarily found in accounting
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for the total manpower costs and expected increases in cost of living allowances, pay
increases, and inflation.
Elements Specific to the ICBM Mission
ICBM alert hours are different from aircraft flying hours in three important
aspects. The alert hours do not vary from year to year, the variable costs drivers are
different, and the weapon system is stationary (granted, it is capable of intercontinental
use, but the cost of an alert hour is associated with a stationary system). The goal is to
have every missile constantly on alert; the weapon system boasts near 100% mission
capable rates (Donley, 2012). However, there is a requirement for scheduled and
unscheduled maintenance. When a single missile is taken “off-alert” for maintenance,
the costs associated with being on alert are still incurred. The site is still secured, manned
and the flight still has all the costs of being on alert (alert costs are explained in further
detail in Chapter III). Therefore, the costs measured for an alert hour can actually be
greater than an off-alert hour (Harlow, 2011). When a missile is removed from a site, it
is called a warm site. Again, due to the increased maintenance demand, the cost of a
warm site can actually be higher than a fully functioning site. However, in a study
conducted at Malmstrom AFB based on FY11 data, the budget office found that a longterm warm site could be operated at about 27% of the cost of fully functioning site
(Steely, 2011:2).
Given that the weapon system is stationary, it incurs costs differently than aircraft.
The details will be provided in Chapter III; here though, it is important to note how fixed
costs have been analyzed in CPFH literature. Aircraft have costs that accumulate
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regardless of any sorties generated. Variables such as temperature, weapon system age,
time spent on the ramp, and cannibalization all lead to costs incurred for aircraft while on
the ground. Using log-linear least square regression with a non-zero intercept was found
to more accurately predicted changes in CPFH (Van Dyk, 2008:80). Many of the above
factors affecting aircraft, leading to the validity of a non-zero intercept, are also present
for ICBMs.
Unique ICBM Funding History
Neil Sheehan recounts the origins of the ICBM program in a biography of
Bernard Schriever. He describes the multifaceted approach Schriever took to accomplish
developing the ICBM program in a short amount of time. Many contracts were made
with manufacturers, suppliers, construction companies, and engineering divisions. The
contracts were all managed in-house by Schriever’s team (Sheehan, 2009). Over time,
the management of the ICBM program evolved through multiple homes in the DOD
including Strategic Air Command, Air Force Space Command, and Air Force Global
Strike Command. Until 1997, the Air Force managed the many contracts for the ICBMs.
In 1997, Northrup Grumman was selected as the ICBM Prime Integration Contractor
(IPIC) on a 15-year contract expiring in FY12. The DOD policy no longer allows
integration contractors without explicit approval; therefore, the process will revert to a
structure similar to the pre-1997 structure (Harlow, 2011). Insourcing the integration
contract will bring opportunities for more direct oversight and potential savings.
However, just as in the commercial sector, not all decisions to insource or outsource are
based on monetary factors alone (Johnson, Leenders, and Flynn, 2011:129).
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Out/Insourcing Based on Factors Other Than Just Cost
The goal of cost models is to better understand how costs are distributed. An
increased understanding of cost distributions can allow management to make better
financial decisions (Kaplan and Cooper, 1998:107). However, cost is only one element
of the decision process. In one ABC study, the Army found childcare facilities on Army
installations cost up to twice as much as comparable commercial facilities due to higher
worker-child ratios and higher wages. The Army decided (as of the writing of the thesis)
to keep the childcare facilities open based on troop morale and convenience (Peters,
1999:1). Similarly, if an aspect of the nuclear enterprise is deemed critical for strategic
purposes, then it may be maintained even if there were a more cost effective alternative.
Civilian businesses also face decisions to insource, outsource; or, as Harry Moser
presents, they can offshore (Moser, 2012). The factors that affect a company’s decision
to insource, outsource, or offshore are similar to the factors that led to outsourcing the
maintenance contract in 1997. While the production of critical components of the nuclear
enterprise is closely monitored, it is beneficial to consider what led (and could lead in the
future) to outsourcing the maintenance for the LGM-30. In the commercial sector, the
factors leading to major outsourcing decisions are apparent in the decision to move an
aspect of the firm overseas, also known as offshoring. Offshoring is a unique form of
operating in another country where the company can move in entirety, or it can outsource
a portion of its operations to a company in another country (Moser, 2012). Of utmost
concern to a commercial enterprise is the profitability of such a move. Moser asserts than
many sourcing decisions are based on price alone, resulting in 20-30% miscalculation of
actual costs (Moser, 2012). Numerous factors affect the decision to outsource (or
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insource a previously outsourced function). Outsourcing may result in increased risks,
increased lead times, supply restraints and unexpected fees (Johnson, et al, 2011:128).
Dr. Thomas Goldsby states that out of 50 multi-billion dollar companies who decided to
outsource overseas, 75% were dissatisfied with their return on investment. He attributed
the unexpected meager returns to a lack of assessing all parameters, which lead to
unexpected outcomes (Goldsby, 2012). Therefore, it is imperative for a company and
government entities to consider all the affected aspects of a situation before making
major change in process (Johnson, et al, 2011:129). Similarly, the Air Force has
observed that some decisions to outsource did not turn out to save as much as first
expected (Harlow, 2011).
ICBM CPAH Considerations
CPAH is not an operationally flexible metric like CPFH. Missile alert hours are
not adjusted in the same way that scheduled flying hours are adjusted based on the
approved yearly budget. Unger modified a CPFH model and found that the proportional
method used to determine CPFH amounts is only accurate when the number of hours
flown is relatively close to the number of hours used to develop the CPFH value (Unger,
2008:87). The area of accuracy is narrowed for the LGM-30, given that ICBMs have a
constant number of alert hours. The proportional model can lead decision makers to
believe that flying one less hour will save the full CPFH amount and that adding one
more hour will require a full CPFH amount increase. However, the non-proportional
nature of the CPFH [and certainly the CPAH] models make for poor marginal analysis
(Hess, 2009:35).
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564th MS Deactivation Case Study
The 2006 Quadrennial Review directed DOD to “Reduce the number of deployed
Minuteman III ballistic missiles from 500 to 450 beginning in Fiscal Year 2007”
(Rumsfeld, 2006:50). The Air Force selected the 564th Missile Squadron (MS) of the
341st Missile Wing (MW) at Malmstrom Air Force Base (AFB) to be deactivated. The
decision was both a strategic and financial decision. Eliminating a squadron from the
341st MW would bring all three MWs to an equal 150 missiles each. The 564th MS may
have been selected because it used missiles built and installed by General Electric while
all other MM III missiles were built and installed by Boeing. As a result, the 564th MS
missiles used different training systems and ground technologies (Woolf, 2006:10).
Operating a common system was likely desired as a means to reduce O&M costs.
However, eliminating a missile squadron did not show immediate savings due to the large
deactivation costs (Woolf, 2006:11). As shown in Figure 7, overall costs (adjusted from
“then year dollars” to FY11 dollars) show only a minor decrease while the squadron was
undergoing deactivation, then increased afterwards.
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Figure 7: LGM-30 O&M Costs Over 564th MS Deactivation Period (in millions)
(AFTOC, 2012)

Since 2008, base-level costs have increased, in part, due to increased personnel
costs. Additionally, there have been many modernization and modification initiatives
(Harlow, 2011). In a memo released by the Secretary of the Air Force, Michael Donley,
and Air Force Chief of Staff, General Norton Schwartz, they emphasize the impacts of
the 2013 budget. They state that many modernization projects will be deferred to later
years or canceled. The LGM-30 modifications are not listed explicitly as being kept or
canceled (Donley and Schwartz, 2012). Figure 8 shows the impact that reducing R&D
and Procurement has had on the LGM-30’s total expenditures in recent years. Figure 8
shows the total appropriated dollars for the LGM-30. There are numerous factors
affecting total costs; therefore, it is hard to say directly how significant the impact of
deactivating the 564th MS was to the total budget.
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Figure 8: LGM-30 Appropriations Summary (in millions) (AFTOC, 2012)
Malmstrom AFB is located in Great Falls, Montana; the city commissioned a
report to assess the total dollar revenue the region around the base would likely loose due
to the squadron’s deactivation. Their report included payroll downsizing, reduced utility
consumption, decreased local educational enrollments, facilities O&M, and a general
category of “other areas” that would be affected. The largest factor was the official
estimate reducing the number of manning authorizations by 14.2%. Additionally, the
report estimated that the base would lose an additional 143 indirect positions for a total
area payroll decrease of about 24.9 million dollars. When added to the other categories,
the report estimated the total decrease of revenues (Malmstrom Air Force Base spending)
of about 30.2 million dollars (Great Falls, 2008). These dollar figures were not verified
by the Air Force, but show how the elimination of a squadron, if the reduced manning
authorizations are observed, can provide a significant reduction in costs.

27

Summary
This literature review first discussed the general mechanics of a cost per flying
hour program. Next, applications from the commercial sector were considered as they
related to the flying hour program. The chapter expanded the workings of the Air Force’s
cost per flying hour program by reviewing examples of how the flying hour program has
been used recently. An example of a non-traditional cost per flying hour assessment for
satellites was considered. Finally, this chapter reviewed elements specific to the ICBM
mission, including funding history, force structure, and other aspects of the weapon
system relating to operating costs.
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III. Methodology
In finding and achieving efficiencies, a fundamental challenge is cost
visibility at the decision-making levels. It’s at this point where data – both
qualitative and quantitative – can be used to paint an accurate picture of
the options for senior leaders. But absent such cost visibility – and good
data – we struggle to make the right budget choices.
The Honorable Erin C. Conaton, Under Secretary of the Air Force
Chapter Overview
This chapter presents how data are obtained and what analysis methodology is
used to answer the four research questions from Chapter 1. The chapter begins by
scoping the analysis and explaining the methodology goals of the. Next, the chapter
describes the processes and data used to develop an intercontinental ballistic missile
(ICBM) Air Force Cost Analysis Improvement Group (AFCAIG) cost per alert hour
(CPAH) model. Then, the chapter describes the process and data used for developing an
ICBM Office of the Secretary of Defense, Cost Analysis Improvement Group (OSD
CAIG) CPAH metric. Finally, the chapter shows how the data can be combined to
develop a comprehensive model, accounting for indirect ICBM costs. The results from
each model are presented in Chapter 4.
Methodology Overview
The overall approach is to develop a model for determining ICBM CPAH and to
assess the CPAH at different levels of management. The first part of this approach is
based on the AFCAIG and OSD CAIG CPFH models. The second aspect of the
methodology is similar, though not identical, to how Activity Based Costing (ABC) can
highlight administrative costs that are rolled into operating cost at each hierarchical level
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of management. For the ICBM enterprise, this thesis assesses costs starting with the
single launch facility (LF), then the missile alert facility (MAF) or flight level (10
missiles), squadron level (50 missiles), missile wing (MW) (150 missiles), and the
weapon system (WS) (450 missiles). The WS costs are calculated at the command level
(AFGSC) and the LGM-30G mission series design (MSD) level. The MSD level is
divided by the same number of hours as the command level, but also includes depot costs
not included at the command level. Each echelon total is divided by the number of alert
hours managed at the given level. In actuality, each level acquires slightly fewer alert
hours than the indicated amount. However, the actual amount is less than .01 different
than mathematical totals indicated in Table 3. Additionally, given that a non-alert hour
will likely have equal or greater costs (due to maintenance and security actions), all
calculations are based on the mathematical totals for alert hours shown in Table 3.
Table 3: Alert Hours by Echelon
Echelon
Alert Hours Per Year Alerts Per Year
Launch Facility
8,760
365
Missile Alert Facility 87,600
3650
Missile Squadron
438,000
18,250
Missile Wing
1,314,000
54,750
Command and WS
3,942,000
164,250

Data Sources
The AFCAIG model is derived for the WS, AFGSC, and the wing levels using
data from the Air Force Total Ownership Cost (AFTOC) system. The lower levels
require personal interviews with subject matter experts (SMEs) to determine the depot,
squadron, flight, and missile costs. The wing data is acquired via the AFTOC system and
personal interviews with base-level SMEs, providing a comparative value from two
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perspectives. The OSD CAIG model includes more elements than the AFCAIG model
and requires more data. The data for the ODS CAIG assessments is compiled from
numerous legacy systems into the AFTOC tool (see Table 2). The data set is massive and
can be cumbersome, but making the task more manageable are standard queries that
provide the needed data. However, the standard queries are limited to higher-level
reports for the MDS, command, wing, and base levels. Data are not attributed to a
specific squadron, flight, or LF in the standard queries. Therefore, the OSD CAIG model
is only used for the three top levels of management.
This thesis follows basic ABC principles but is not a full ABC assessment.
“AFTOC is not an Activity Based Cost Accounting System, but is the closest thing the
Air Force has to one” (McNutt, 2012:6). Developing a traditional cost dictionary for
every action in the nuclear enterprise is beyond the scope of a thesis and would be
virtually impossible given the magnitude of the enterprise. The data for the weapon
system, command, and wing are census data, meaning that they include all the data feeds
compiled in AFTOC. The data for the lower levels are samples from one base/wing and
squadron. The data for the MAFs and LFs are assumed to be constant across the
command. This assumption is valid for depot level reparables (DLRs) and personnel
costs, but consumable costs can vary based on the mileage disparity of each MAF and
LF. The wing chosen is the 341st MW at Malmstrom AFB in Great Falls, Montana. The
squadron sampled is the 490th MS. Malmstrom is analyzed for three reasons. First, the
choice is limited to Malmstrom and F.E. Warren because these locations do not have an
active flying wings that could distort the allocation of indirect costs. Secondly, the
researcher was stationed at Malmstrom prior to being assigned to the Air Force Institute
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of Technology (AFIT) and knew many of the contacts needed to collect the data. Finally,
Malmstrom’s sampled costs are very close to the average for the three missile wings (see
Table 4).
Table 4. ICBM Wing OSD CAIG Operating Cost Comparisons
F.E. Warren
Malmstrom
Minot
Average

$164,410,482
$153,257,407
$142,538,245
$153,402,045

The personal interviews with SMEs and the AFTOC system provided ample data
for each echelon (see Figures 9 and 10). However, the data are not available for all
echelons from one source. The AFTOC data does not provide the fidelity to assign cost
to a specific squadron, MAF, or LF with the standard reports. The SMEs provided the
lower-level data for the AFCAIG elements and two of the OSD CAIG elements.

LGM-30G
DLR
CONs
Personnel

SPO
AFMC
SPO*

Wing

Squadron

Flight
(MAF)

Missile
(LF)

AFTOC
AFMC
MAFB

Figure 9: AFCAIG Data Availability

LGM-30G
1.0 Unit Personnel
2.0 Unit Operations
3.0 Maintenance
4.0 Sustaining Support
5.0 Continuing Improvements
6.0 Indirect Support

Wing

Squadron

Flight
(MAF)
MAFB

AFTOC
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Missile
(LF)

Figure 10: OSD CAIG Data Availability

AFCAIG CPAH Models

Figure 11: AFCAIG Model
The AFCAIG CPFH model, as it was described in Chapter II for aircraft, uses
DLRs, consumables, and aviation fuel as the three cost drivers. The ICBM AFCAIG
CPAH model uses DLRs, consumables, and personnel cost as the three cost drivers.
DLRs and consumables are defined the same as for aircraft. Personnel costs for this
model include both active duty and civilian costs. The AFCAIG model data is obtained
from two sources for the wing level. The first is used to develop the AFTOC-AFCAIG
model, with data from the AFTOC system for the wing and higher levels. The second
version uses the same elements, but the data is obtained from the SMEs from the wing
and lower levels. The two versions overlap at the wing level, providing two comparative
data points for an AFCAIG based wing CPAH. The AFTOC-AFCAIG model uses actual
gross obligations from the AFTOC tool to obtain personnel costs for the WS, command,
and wing. The personnel cost in the SME-AFCAIG model are based on personal
interviews and localized documentation to determine the number of personnel authorized
for the wing, squadron, flight, and LF levels.
ICBM data are comprised of about a dozen Program Element Codes (PECs) and
hundreds of Element of Expense/Investment Code (EEICs) to track costs. For the
localized data, PEC 11213F was used (see Appendix E for PEC descriptions). The
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AFTOC system combines all the associated PECs and provides a slightly more
comprehensive picture. Figure 12 shows that PEC 11213F is by far associated with the
largest portion of ICBM costs. Therefore, localized data showing only 11213F does not
include every ICBM cost, but is within 2% of the total costs.

Figure 12: PEC Comparison (AFTOC, 2012).
The operating costs of a missile squadron, MAF, and LF are largely adapted from
a 2011 Malmstrom missile-squadron reduction study. The study looks at variable costs
that would likely be eliminated if one squadron were deactivated. A similar study was
conducted in 2005; the 2005 then year dollars were converted to FY11 values with DOD
Inflation Tables. The researcher integrated the local studies with the AFCAIG model to
determine a cost per alert hour for a LF, MAF, and squadron. This thesis utilizes the
AFCAIG and OSD CAIG basic models; however, it does not, complete the OSD CAIG
process as shown in Figure 13. Currently, ICBMs are not part of the OSD CAIG or
AFCAIG processes for determining a CPFH (or CPAH) metric.
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Figure 13: CAIG Preparation Process (OSD, 1992).
OSD CAIG CPAH Model
The OSD CAIG model is more inclusive than the AFCAIG model. Data for the
OSD Model are divided into 6 elements listed below.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Unit Personnel
Unit Operations
Maintenance
Sustaining Support
Continuing System Improvements
Indirect Support
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Figure 14: OSD CAIG Operating Cost Model

Figure 15: OSD CAIG Ownership Cost Model
Figures 14 and 15 show the OSD CAIG operating and ownership CPAH models.
Figure 6 shows what elements are added to each model and how the AFCAIG and OSD
CAIG models relate to one another. In addition to the standard reports used to assess
costs, Mr. Billy Kirby from the Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC) Central Asset
Management (CAM) office accessed in-depth supply costs from the AFTOC system for
the weapon system for comparison to the standard reports. The supply data shows
charges for what items are purchased and credits for items returned. Each transaction
includes the MDS, location (down to the base level) and time period. The AFTOC
supply data also contains numerous financial identifiers to narrow the scope of
transactions included in the queries. For this comparison, the focus is on Budget Codes 8
and 9 for PEC 11213F. There are more than 20 PECs associated with the installations
that house the ICBMs. Many of the PECs are historical and only used to show credit for
an item no longer in use. Other PECs identify items purchased for tenant units. The PEC
11213F accounts for 98% of the total cost and is the focus of the lower-level analysis; a
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description of the PEC is below. Descriptions of other PECs used are presented in
Appendix E.
Minuteman Squadrons: This program element supports the operation and
maintenance of the Minutemen weapon system. It supports missile
modifications to include Guidance Replacement and Propulsion
Replacement Programs. The PE includes manpower authorizations,
peculiar and support equipment, necessary facilities and the associated
costs specifically identified and measurable to the Minuteman weapon
system. Includes: wing headquarters, missile squadrons, missile
maintenance, munitions maintenance and weapon system security.
Excludes: nuclear warhead component costs which are handled by the
Department of Energy and dedicated intrasite communications.
(AFCAIG, 2010)

The data from the AFTOC system are also compared with data from the ICBM
system program office (SPO) for depot related costs. The first appropriation code this
analysis considers at the depot is from the FY11 priority buy (PB) Position 3020. When
it is added to the O&M cost (3400), it matches the AFTOC figures for DLR costs.
However, the cost from Automated Budget Interactive Data Environment System
(ABIDES) Position 3600, for research and development (R&D), is not included in the
lowest three layers of the OSD CAIG model. It is added last to calculate the total weapon
system Ownership Cost (see Figure 15). The R&D costs are significant, totaling
$135,140,000; yet if they are distributed across the weapon system’s yearly alert hours,
they represent only a $34.00 increase per alert hour.
Comprehensive Model
The OSD CAIG model is a robust model, giving a good picture of costs incurred
by a particular WS. The ability of AFTOC to provide installation indirect costs and the
ICBMs’ unique structure allows an additional analysis that is more subjective yet could
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prove beneficial when trying to understand all costs associated with the weapon system.
As described in Chapter I, the LGM-30 is a component of the larger WS-133A/M
including airborne launch control centers (ALCC), EC-135s, MILSTAR satellites, etc
(see Figure 2). Moreover, the ICBMs are stationary and have a large indirect support
footprint covering thousands of square miles. The indirect costs incurred by a WS are
harder to quantify than the direct cost captured in the AFTOC system. For example, a
satellite that supports the LGM-30 will also support many other weapons systems. Some
indirect cost can be divided based on percentage of use, but others are harder to divide.
Therefore, this analysis uses the Indirect Costs Summary Report data provided by the
AFTOC system for each of the ICBM MWs. The indirect costs include base operating
and support items that are assumed to be independent of the weapon system but necessary
for a mission to occur at a given location. Some indirect costs include base housing, real
property costs, medical costs, and utilities maintenance. For the 90th MW and the 341st
MW, where there is only one major weapon system on the installation; the indirect costs
for the base can be largely attributed to the LGM-30. Although, there is a likely a slight
overlap with some of the tenant units. For the 91st MW at Minot AFB, the indirect costs
are divided between other wings on the same installation by the AFTOC system. When
the attributed indirect cost are added to the ownership costs of the OSD CAIG model, a
comprehensive costs is derived (see Figure 16). The results for each model are discussed
in Chapter IV.

Figure 16: Comprehensive Model
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Summary
This chapter describes the elements used to develop three models for assessing
ICBM CPAH factors. The first model is adapted from the AFCAIG model and includes
DLRs, consumables, and personnel costs. The second model is based on the OSD CAIG
structure and provides ICBM operating cost and ownership cost. The final model is more
subjective and incorporates the unique support structure of the ICBMs. The final model
can provide a comprehensive cost consideration of the ICBM CPAH.
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IV. Analysis and Results
Chapter Overview
The data analysis seeks to determine how the Air Force Cost Analysis
Improvement Group (AFCAIG) and Office of the Secretary of Defense, Cost Analysis
Group (OSD CAIG), and Comprehensive models can be used to determine an LGM-30
cost per alert hour (CPAH). It is not organized to assess the models’ power as
proportional predictive models. However, given the described structure of the
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) force, it is necessary to consider the fixed costs
when accurately describing the CPAH. The CPAH appear to follow a step function
based on the level of management for each echelon. Table 8 shows how each level of
management has distinct changes in CPAH. The presented analysis emphasizes the step
function and the relation of fixed costs to prevent any misconceptions about
proportionality among model comparisons. A more apt view of the data could be to
consider it a cost per LGM-30 echelon (flight, squadron, etc.) rather than a CPAH (see
Table 8).
AFCAIG Model Results
First, data for the AFCAIG based model are presented. All costs are compared
using fiscal year 2011 (FY11) values. Historical figures have been converted from then
year dollars to FY11 dollars to account for inflation. The wing-level AFCAIG data is
collected from both local interviews with subject matter experts (SMEs) (shown in Table
5) and the Air Force Total Ownership Cost (AFTOC) (shown in Table 6). The data for
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the consumables and personnel cost are acquired from the base –level SMEs, while the
shaded data is based on data provided by the ICBM system program office (SPO) for
DLRs.
Table 5: AFCAIG, SME CPAH Results
Wing

Squadron

DLR

$

$ 1,212,292 $

CONs
Personnel

3,636,875

Flight (MAF) Missile (LF)
242,458

$

24,246

$ 18,062,296

$ 5,066,808 $ 1,983,260

$

61,124

$ 154,166,467

$ 9,902,356 $

754,808

$

5,737

$ 2,980,526

$

91,107

Total Assessed Cost $ 175,865,638

$16,181,456

Alert Hours

$

1,314,000

$

438,000 $

87,600

$

8,760

CPAH

$

134

$

37 $

34

$

10

The depot level reparable (DLR) and consumable cost drivers are very close to
each other, within 5% each. However, the personnel costs are significantly different,
with about 38% difference in the data obtained from AFTOC system and the base-level
SMEs. The reason for the personnel cost-disparity is that the lower-level costs are based
on authorizations multiplied by the DOD-AF active duty composite rates. The AFTOC
personnel values are not solely based on authorizations, but on actual costs incurred.
Given that the wings and squadrons are not fully manned, it is expected that costs based
on authorizations will be greater than the actual costs incurred (Lara, 2012). The
disparity affects the data obtained from the base level for the wing and squadron
personnel costs. However, the data for the launch facilities (LFs) and flights or missile
alert facilities (MAFs) provides an accurate portrayal of personnel costs because the LF
and MAF teams are set sizes and the personnel costs are stable.
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Table 6: AFCAIG, AFTOC CPAH Results
LGM-30

AFGSC

Wing

DLR

$

10,910,625 $

10,437,648

$

3,636,875

CONs

$

97,601,809 $

97,580,167

$

12,350,229

Personnel

$

459,298,121 $

440,878,762

$

135,307,896

Total Assessed Cost $

567,810,555 $

548,896,577

$

151,294,999

Alert Hours

$

3,942,000 $

3,942,000

$

1,314,000

CPAH

$

144 $

139

$

115

As shown in Chapter II, there are many factors that can actually increase costs
when a LF is down for maintenance or other reasons. Therefore, the likelihood of saving
$10.40 for every hour that a missile is off-alert is negligible. Rather, the value of the
metric is to highlight the smallness of the marginal CPAH per missile. Both sets of data,
and results, include the wing level CPAH. Table 5 shows the AFCAIG SME CPAH
results for the wing, squadron, MAF and LF, while Table 6 contains the AFCAIG
AFTOC CPAH results for AFGSC, the weapon system, and the wing. The CPAH values
for the wing level can be contrasted a third time with the OSD CAIG based model shown
in Table 7.
OSD CAIG Model Results
The OSD CAIG-based model derives a CPAH for the WS, AFGSC, and wing
echelons. All the data for the six elements of the OSD CAIG model comes from the
AFTOC system. The modification costs were provided by the ICBM SPO and were
verified with the AFTOC values. The figures under the heading Operating include all the
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OSD items included in Figure 2 and Appendix C. The OSD CAIG total Ownership Cost
includes all the items comprising the LGM-30 Operating cost plus modification cost, for
a total of $328.

OSD CAIG Elements
1.0 Unit Personnel
2.0 Unit Operations
3.0 Maintenance
4.0 Sustaining Support
5.0 Cont Systm Improv.
6.0 Indirect Support
Modification Cost
Total Assessed Cost
Alert Hours
CPAH

$
$
$
$
$
$

Table 7: OSD CAIG CPAH
LGM-30
AFGSC
Ownership
Operating
Operating
420,509,716 $ 420,509,716 $ 403,999,241
46,368,719 $ 46,368,719 $ 59,530,962
306,843,120 $ 306,843,120 $
21,585,028 $ 21,585,028 $ 7,971,981
103,828,658 $ 103,828,658 $ 1,850,705
49,124,926 $ 49,124,926 $ 48,887,526

Wing
Operating
$ 135,307,896
$ 7,797,141
$ 4,553,088
$
$
$ 11,578,767

$ 343,956,000
$ 1,292,216,167 $ 948,260,167 $ 522,240,415 $ 159,236,891
$

3,942,000
328 $

3,942,000
241 $

3,942,000
132 $

1,314,000
121

Comprehensive Model Results
The Comprehensive model includes all the costs of the OSD CAIG Ownership
Costs plus the indirect costs for the associated installation. The indirect costs almost
double the costs at each echelon. A necessary caveat to the Comprehensive model’s
results is that the indirect costs are not directly attributable to the weapon system. Rather,
the indirect costs are associated with the location of the weapon system. The indirect
costs for the wing in Table 8 are the indirect cost for Malmstrom AFB. The indirect costs
for AFGSC include the indirect cost from Malmstrom AFB, F.E. Warren AFB, and the
91st MW at Minot AFB. The data for Malmstrom AFB and F.E. Warren AFB capture
indirect costs that include most base-operating costs including items like facility support
and medical operations. However, the figure for the 91st MW is only a percentage of
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total installation indirect costs. The percentage varies for each item and is determined by
AFTOC. The total 91st MW indirect costs account for about 1% of the total indirect
costs at Minot. The majority of the indirect costs for Minot are assigned to the 5th
Bomber Wing (BW) by the AFTOC tool. The Comprehensive model costs provide a
broader perspective of the total costs DOD incurs each hour to operate the LGM-30.
However, it is emphasized that the values reflected in the Comprehensive model reflect
many costs that would remain if the ICBM mission were to cease at those installations.
For example, a large percentage of the personnel would likely be transferred to other
missions and continue to be an expense to the DOD. Appendix C contains tables
showing the comparative results of the OSD CAIG Operating and Ownership CPAH
results to the Comprehensive CPAH results.
Table 8: Comprehensive CPAH
OSD CAIG Elements
LGM-30*
AFGSC
1.0 Unit Personnel
$
680,391,818 $
660,697,776
2.0 Unit Operations
$
142,175,907 $
155,316,508
3.0 Maintenance
$
308,637,741 $
1,794,621
4.0 Sustaining Support
$
23,789,427 $
10,176,380
5.0 Continuing Sys Improv. $
103,829,958 $
1,852,005
6.0 Indirect Support
$
870,368,190 $
866,879,679
Modification Cost
$
343,956,000
Total Assessed Cost
$ 2,473,149,042 $ 1,696,716,969
Alert Hours
CPAH

$

3,942,000
627.38 $
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Wing
$ 154,166,467
$
13,209,287
$
4,853,010
$
$
$ 140,485,240
$

3,942,000
430.42 $

312,714,003
1314000
237.99

Investigative Questions Answered
1. Can the AFCAIG and OSD CAIG aircraft CPFH models be used to develop a
CPAH model for the LGM-30 weapon system? If so, what are the
differences?
This thesis presents two models already in use by the Air Force. The AFCAIG
model is used by modifying the cost drivers to fit the unique aspects of the Minuteman
III. It incorporates two of the three drivers from the CPFH model: DLRs and
consumables, including GPC items. The third CPFH driver, aviation fuel, is replaced
with personnel costs to acquire a CPAH metric. The OSD CAIG model is used for the
LGM-30 without any manual modification. The modifications occur in the internal
workings of the AFTOC system. For example, the AFTOC system includes “range
support” in item 6.7 for the aircraft OSD CAIG totals, but includes “cost of supporting
live fire of missiles” for missile OSD CAIG item 6.7.
2. Do the cost per alert hour factors change significantly based on the level of
management?
The CPAH values of the AFCAIG model do increase disproportionally with each
level of management, but not as drastically as the OSD CAIG model or comprehensive
models (see Table 9). The AFCAIG model includes fewer cost drivers than the other two
models, likely contributing to it monotonically increasing over the echelons.
Additionally, the drivers not part of the AFCAIG model are the most varied costs of the
weapon system. The steadiness of the AFCAIG drivers is emphasized in the comparison
between the wing, AFGSC, and weapon system AFCAIG CPAH figures (see Table 6).
The AFGSC and weapon system CPAH figures only increase by 20% and 3%
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respectively from the previous (lower) level of management. Conversely, the OSD CAIG
CPAH figures for the weapon system and AFGSC increase by 80% and 46% respectively
from the next lower level of management. This results because the three AFCAIG
drivers are mainly spent at the base level. However, the OSD CAIG drivers include
items (e.g. contractor support) that are spent largely at the higher levels of management.
The OSD CAIG and Comprehensive models do not have the needed fidelity to
distinguish cost below the wing level, thus a comparison is only presented down to the
base level.

Table 9: Echelon CPAH Comparison

AFCAIG CPAH
OSD CAIG CPAH
Comprehensive

LGM-30G AFGSC
Wing
Squadron
$ 144.04 $ 139.24 $ 115.14 $ 36.94
$ 327.81
$ 627.38

Flight
(MAF)
$ 34.02

Missile
(LF)
$10.40

$ 132.48 $ 121.18
$ 430.42 $ 237.99

3. What cost drivers should be included in developing a comprehensive CPAH
model for the LGM-30 weapon system?
The drivers for the AFCAIG model are selected based on their portion of impact
on the total weapon system costs. Three elements are desired based on the three elements
of the accepted AFCAIG model. Nonetheless, this analysis could have included more or
fewer AFCAIG drivers as fitting. The three factors of the AFCAIG CPAH model
account for the three largest portions of the available weapon system drivers. The main
diversion of the traditional CPFH model is replacing aviation fuel with personnel costs.
This change is made because fuel, POL, and electricity account for .5% of the total
weapon system cost, while personnel account for 46.5% of the weapon system costs. The
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cost drivers for the OSD CAIG model are not modified for this analysis. Appendix B
provides an expanded list of the OSD CAIG drivers.
4. What is the expected relationship of costs and alert hours?
The relationship of costs and alert hours is presented in multiple formats to
provide readers with the broadest perspective of how a CPAH metric can be utilized.
Some applications will benefit from using the AFCAIG model. The AFCAIG model
provides the most commonly adapted model for predictive metrics. The OSD CAIG
model provides an in-depth analysis from data that is accessible to AFTOC users and
regularly updated. The Comprehensive model provides decision makers an analysis of
how much money is likely to be affected by decisions that affect an entire level of
management. Further recommendations on applications for the models are presented in
Chapter V. Finally, this analysis shows how the CPAH metrics are not proportional.
One less alert hour will not directly reduce the bottom line proportionally to the CPAH
figures from the models. This relationship is observable in the vast differences between a
marginal costs of $10.40 for one missile and a Comprehensive costs (including all the
weapon system direct and indirect support) of $627.38 shown Table 9. The ICBMs are
not turned on and off by the hour and the fixed costs associated with operating the
weapon system are very large. Thus, if only one ICBM is on alert, the costs will not be
the marginal $10.40 per hour. Considering the fixed costs is imperative for accurate
strategic-level decisions.
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Summary
Chapter IV includes the results from the three models developed and analyzed.
The analysis shows how the models are used to develop multiple perspectives for a
CPAH metric. The models are not developed as proportional predictive models. This
chapter shows how each level of management generates distinct changes in the CPAH.
The model emphasizes the step function and the relation of fixed costs to provide an
accurate assessment for decision makers. Finally, each model has strengths and
weaknesses for decision makers; Chapter V presents the recommended uses of each
model.
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V. Conclusion and Recommendations
Chapter Overview
This chapter presents the concluding remarks and recommendations for further
research. The analysis presented in this thesis is the result of both census data for the
entire weapon system and survey data acquired from the base level. Together, the data
provide a wide swath of analysis, but do not go in depth at any one echelon. Much could
be gained from looking at only one level in greater detail. A goal of this thesis was to
provide the sponsor and other interested parties with a broad overview of ICBM-costs
drivers. This broad perspective will allow future analysts, and decision makers, to make
informed decisions regarding follow-on studies. Below are recommendations from this
researcher based on experience gained during this study.
Recommendations for Model Use
Each model has strengths and weaknesses for given situations. The best model is
determined by the decision makers’ needs and acceptable assumptions. First, the
AFCAIG model is weakened by limiting the elements considered. It is based on the cost
assessments for flying missions from the 1960s, when less data was readily available.
Today, the robust capabilities of the AFTOC system render limiting of considered factors
of the AFCAIG model unnecessary. Nonetheless, it is still the most widely accepted
model in the Air Force flying community. Therefore, it is best suited for comparisons to
the larger Air Force.
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The OSD CAIG model requires more data and involves more factors for
consideration. The capability of the AFTOC system to synthesize all of the needed
elements mitigates what would have been impossibly daunting using only the Air Force’s
legacy systems. The readily accessible data set in the AFTOC system makes the OSD
CAIG model an informative tool for considering the cost directly attributable to the
weapon system. Therefore, it is best suited for the decision makers in the ICBM
community.
Lastly, the Comprehensive model’s main weakness is the assumptions about what
happens to the resources if a mission ceases. The Comprehensive model includes the
support items for the ICBM installations. If the ICBM mission were to cease at that
location, not all the costs would be eliminated. Likely, many of the resources would
cross-flow where possible and some may be put into long-term storage. The complex
endeavor of deactivating an entire installation would require further analysis beyond the
scope of this thesis. However, the Comprehensive model does provide insight about the
total costs the ICBM enterprise incurs to operate. This model is most applicable to
strategic-level decision makers.
Recommendations for Action
The researcher came across a few items that are worthy of deeper focus in future
studies. One such item would be to determine why the 91st MW is only assigned 1% of
the indirect costs at Minot. It may be that the MW consumes significantly fewer
resources than the 5th BW, but the actual percentage should be verified. Further analysis
of other percentages of indirect costs at each base are worthy of more analysis. This

50

thesis is unclassified, which limits some of the analysis of how future options could affect
indirect costs. However, it would be beneficial to determine if there is a plan (and what it
is) for directing resources if any echelon of the WS is deactivated. For example, what
percentage of personnel would be affected if a LF, MAF, squadron, or wing were
eliminated? In addition, would the personnel be reassigned within the enterprise,
reassigned to another weapon system, or eliminated? In addition to the personnel driver,
assigning indirect costs can also be affected by the intended use of a base if the mission is
changed. If an installation receives a new mission in place of the ICBM mission, then the
installation-indirect costs will no longer be associated with the WS-133A/M, but will still
be a real cost to the DOD.
Recommendations for Future Research
Future research can expand this model by developing a predictive model for
CPAH. The current analysis is based on FY11 values. This analysis does not identify
what the expected CPAH will be in future years. Developing a predictive model is a
challenging proposal, but could be very useful to decision makers. In the course of
collecting data for this thesis, the researcher was provided a chart similar to Figure 18
below. The figure shows the O&M and active duty personnel appropriated funds for the
LGM-30G; the data is from PEC 11213F. All dollar values are adjusted from “then year
dollars” to FY11 dollars. The graph shows how the selected cost drivers have been
increasing most years. As this thesis shows, there are other cost drivers that may paint a
more accurate picture. Figure 19, includes the same cost drivers as Figure 18 along with
research, development, testing, and evaluation (RDT&E) and procurement costs. All
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four elements together comprise the total appropriated funds for the weapon system.
When all the drivers are chosen, a very different trend emerges. Thus, future research
would need to analyze carefully which drivers best predict total WS costs for future
years.

Figure 17: LGM-30 O&M and Personnel Appropriations Summary (in millions)
(AFTOC, 2012)

Figure 18: LGM-30 Appropriations Summary (in millions) (AFTOC, 2012)
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Another element to consider in future research would be a variable accounting for
the average age of the ICBM and/or ICBM selected components. As stated in the
literature review, systems experience higher failure rates as they age. The accuracy of
predicting future CPAHs will be increased if the model is able to account for the
expected increase in failures based on age, year over year. Additionally, a predictive
model could include the number of maintenance visits per LF as a variable. Many of the
cost associated with operating the ICBMs are fixed; however, the largest variable portion
is related to maintenance actions.
Summary
This chapter provides the researchers final remarks and recommendations for
future analyses. This thesis presents both AF level data and data obtained from
interviews with SMEs. The result is a broad analysis across each level of management
for the Minuteman III. This wide-ranging perspective prepares the field for future
researchers and decision makers to conduct more in-depth follow-on studies. The results
of this study, along with future studies, will continue to improve our stewardship of the
ICBM nuclear component.
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Appendix A: Abbreviations and Acronyms
ABIDES
AF
AFB
AFCIAG
AFGSC
AFTOC
BW
CAPE
CPAH
CPFH
DLR
EEIC
ICBM
IPIC
LF
LGM-30
MAF
MM III
MW
OSD CAIG
PEC
WS
WS-133A/M

Automated Budget Interactive Data
Environment System
Air Force
Air Force Base
Air Force Cost Improvement Group
Air Force Global Strike Command
Air Force Total Ownership Cost
Bomber Wing
Cost Analysis Program Evaluation
Cost-per-[missile] alert-hour
Cost-per-flying-hour
Depot Level Reparables
Element of Expense/Investment Code
Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
ICBM Prime Integration Contract
Launch Facility (Single Minuteman III)
Nomenclature for Minuteman III
Missile Alert Facility (Missile Flight)
Minuteman III ICBM
Missile Wing
Office of Secretary of Defense Cost
Analysis Improvement Group
Program Element Code
Weapon System
Nomenclature for entire Minuteman III
weapon system and peripheral systems

54

Appendix B: AFCAIG (CAPE) Missile
Operating and Support Cost Element Structure

1.0

MISSION PERSONNEL

1.1

OPERATIONS

1.2

MAINTENANCE

1.3

OTHER MISSION PERSONNEL

2.0

UNIT-LEVEL CONSUMPTION

2.1

POL/ENERGY CONSUMPTION

2.2

CONSUMABLE MATERIAL/REPAIR PARTS

2.3

DEPOT-LEVEL REPARABLES

2.4

TRAINING MUNITIONS/EXPENDABLE STORES

2.5

OTHER

3.0

INTERMEDIATE MAINTENANCE (EXTERNAL TO UNIT)

3.1

MAINTENANCE

3.2

CONSUMABLE MATERIAL/REPAIR PARTS

3.3

OTHER

4.0

DEPOT MAINTENANCE

4.1

OVERHAUL/REWORK

4.2

OTHER

5.0
5.1

CONTRACTOR SUPPORT
INTERIM CONTRACTOR SUPPORT
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5.2

CONTRACTOR LOGISTICS SUPPORT

5.3

OTHER

6.0

SUSTAINING SUPPORT

6.1

SUPPORT EQUIPMENT REPLACEMENT

6.2

MODIFICATION KIT PROCUREMENT/INSTALLATION

6.3

OTHER RECURRING INVESTMENT

6.4

SUSTAINING ENGINEERING SUPPORT

6.5

SOFTWARE MAINTENANCE SUPPORT

6.6

SIMULATOR OPERATIONS

6.7

AIR SUPPORT

6.8

OTHER

7.0

INDIRECT SUPPORT

7.1

PERSONNEL SUPPORT

7.2

INSTALLATION SUPPORT
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Appendix C: OSD CAIG Based Model Details

OSD OWNERSHIP
COST
OSD OPERATING
COST

LGM-30

CPA
CPAH
Alert Hours
Total Assessed Cost
Modification Cost
1.0 Unit Personnel
2.0 Unit Operations
3.0 Maintenance
4.0 Sustaining Support
5.0 Continuing System Improvements
6.0 Indirect Support

Comprehensive Ownership Operating
Indirect
15,057
7,867
5,773
7,190
627
328
241
300
3,942,000
3,942,000 3,942,000
3,942,000
2,473,149,042 1,292,216,167 948,260,167 1,180,932,875
343,956,000 343,956,000
680,391,818 420,509,716 420,509,716 259,882,102
142,175,907
46,368,719 46,368,719
95,807,188
308,637,741 306,843,120 306,843,120
1,794,621
23,789,427
21,585,028 21,585,028
2,204,399
103,829,958 103,828,658 103,828,658
1,300
870,368,190
49,124,926 49,124,926 821,243,264

OSD OWNERSHIP
COST
OSD OPERATING
COST

AFGSC

CPA
CPAH
Alert Hours
Total Assessed Cost
Modification Cost
1.0 Unit Personnel
2.0 Unit Operations
3.0 Maintenance
4.0 Sustaining Support
5.0 Continuing Sys Impmts
6.0 Indirect Support

Wing (Malmstrom)

Comp.
Operating
Indirect
Comp.
Operating
Indirect
10,330
3,180
7,151
5,712
2,908
2,803
430
132
298
238
121
117
3,942,000 3,942,000
3,942,000
1314000
1314000
1314000
1,696,716,969 522,240,415 1,174,476,554 312,714,003 159,236,891 153,477,113
660,697,776 403,999,241
155,316,508 59,530,962
1,794,621
0
10,176,380 7,971,981
1,852,005 1,850,705
866,879,679 48,887,526
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256,698,535 154,166,467 135,307,896 18,858,572
95,785,546 13,209,287 7,797,141 5,412,146
1,794,621 4,853,010 4,553,088
299,922
2,204,399
0
0
0
1,300
0
0
0
817,992,153 140,485,240 11,578,767 128,906,473

Appendix D: Minuteman III Description (USAF, LGM-30 Factsheet)
Mission
The LGM-30G Minuteman intercontinental ballistic missile, or ICBM, is an
element of the nation's strategic deterrent forces under the control of the Air Force Global
Strike Command. The "L" in LGM is the Department of Defense designation for silolaunched; "G" means surface attack; and "M" stands for guided missile.
Features
The Minuteman is a strategic weapon system using a ballistic missile of
intercontinental range. Missiles are dispersed in hardened silos to protect against attack
and connected to an underground launch control center through a system of hardened
cables. Launch crews, consisting of two officers, perform around-the-clock alert in the
launch control center.
A variety of communication systems provide the president and secretary of
defense with highly reliable, virtually instantaneous direct contact with each launch crew.
Should command capability be lost between the launch control center and remote missile
launch facilities, specially configured E-6B airborne launch control center aircraft
automatically assume command and control of the isolated missile or missiles. Fully
qualified airborne missile combat crews aboard airborne launch control center aircraft
would execute the president's orders.
An extensive life extension program is underway to keep the remaining missiles
safe, secure and reliable well into the 21st century. These major programs include:
remanufacture of the solid-propellant rocket motors, replacement of standby power
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systems, repair of launch facilities, and installation of updated, survivable
communications equipment and additional security enhancements.
Background
The Minuteman weapon system was conceived in the late 1950s and Minuteman I
was deployed in the early 1960s. Minuteman was a revolutionary concept and an
extraordinary technical achievement. Both the missile and basing components
incorporated significant advances beyond the relatively slow-reacting, liquid-fueled,
remotely-controlled intercontinental ballistic missiles of the previous generation. From
the beginning, Minuteman missiles have provided a quick-reacting, inertially guided,
highly survivable component to America's strategic deterrent program. Minuteman's
maintenance concept capitalizes on high reliability and a "remove and replace" approach
to achieve a near 100 percent alert rate.
Through state-of-the-art improvements, the Minuteman system has evolved to
meet new challenges and assume new missions. Modernization programs have resulted in
new versions of the missile, expanded targeting options, improved accuracy and
survivability. Today's Minuteman weapon system is the product of almost 40 years of
continuous enhancement.
The current Minuteman force consists of 450 Minuteman III's located at the 90th
Missile Wing at F.E. Warren AFB, Wyo.; the 341st Missile Wing at Malmstrom AFB,
Mont.; and the 91st Missile at Minot AFB, N.D.
General Characteristics
Primary Function: Intercontinental ballistic missile
Contractor: Boeing Co.
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Power Plant: Three solid-propellant rocket motors; first stage - Thiokol; second stage Aerojet-General; third stage - United Technologies Chemical Systems Division
Thrust: First stage, 202,600 pounds
Length: 59.9 feet (18 meters)
Weight: 79,432 pounds (36,030 kilograms)
Diameter: 5.5 feet (1.67 meters)
Range: 6,000-plus miles (5,218 nautical miles)
Speed: Approximately 15,000 mph (Mach 23 or 24,000 kph) at burnout
Ceiling: 700 miles (1,120 kilometers)
Date deployed: June 1970, production cessation: December 1978
Inventory: Active force, 450; Reserve, 0; ANG, 0
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Appendix E: Program Element Codes Used
PE
Title
(AF - 6
Digit)
11198F Management
HQ-Global Strike
Command
(AFGSC)

11213F MINUTEMAN
Squadrons

11215F PEACEKEEPER
Squadrons

11235F ICBM Helicopter
Support

Description

Includes manpower authorizations, peculiar and support
equipment, necessary facilities and the associated costs
specifically identified and measurable to the following:
Global Strike Command (GSC); HQ 8th Air Force;
Excludes non-management headquarters resources
WWMCCS ADP.
Minuteman Squadrons: This program element supports the
operation and maintenance of the Minutemen weapon
system. It supports missile modifications to include
Guidance Replacement and Propulsion Replacement
Programs. The PE includes manpower authorizations,
peculiar and support equipment, necessary facilities and the
associated costs specifically identified and measurable to
the Minuteman weapon system. Includes: wing
headquarters, missile squadrons, missile maintenance,
munitions maintenance and weapon system security.
Excludes: nuclear warhead component costs which are
handled by the Department of Energy and dedicated
intrasite communications.
Peacekeeper Squadrons: Includes manpower
authorizations, peculiar and support equipment, necessary
facilities and the associated costs specifically identified and
measurable to the Peacekeeper weapon system (Minuteman
silos basing mode). Includes Wing Headquarters, Missile
Squadrons, Missile Maintenance, Munitions Maintenance,
Missile Site Support Aircraft, Weapons System Security,
and weapons system acquisition costs. Excludes advanced
missile training, nuclear warhead component costs which
are borne by Atomic Energy Commission and missile site
support.
ICBM Helicopter Support: Funds operational costs for
ICBM helicopter support required by nuclear weapon
system safety rules for convoy movements. Provides
essential equipment, crew manpower, and flying hours for
commanders to run day-to-day maintenance and operation
of these MAC operated helicopters in support of SACs
ICBM fleet.
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11321F Special Purpose
Communications

11323F MINUTEMAN
Communications

11879F Facilities
Operations Offensive

Special Purpose Communications: Includes manpower
authorizations, peculiar and support equipment, necessary
facilities and the associated costs specifically identified and
measurable to the following: Air Force Low Frequency
System (487L) Transmitters Receivers at Northern Area
UHF Sites, Minuteman and Titan Missile Sites, Wing
Command Posts, and COC Communications Squadrons
Excludes resources identified to the airborne command
posts (see PACCS elements in this program and Programs
2 and 3).
Minuteman Communications: Includes the non-DCS
procurement, construction, and operations resources
required to support the ICBM Minuteman Squadrons (PE
0101213F)and the communications resources required to
support the administrative, logistic, and launch/status
functions. Additionally, this program element includes the
intersite and intrasite communications resources required to
support the command control function. Excludes
communications resources integral to the weapons system
which are designed for and delivered with and as a part of
the missile complex, and whose costs are normally
included in the cost of the weapons system.
Facilities Operations - Offensive: Includes manpower
authorizations, peculiar and support equipment, necessary
facilities, contracts, and associated costs to plan, manage,
and execute these functions: Fire prevention and protection
including crash rescue, emergency response, and disaster
preparedness, engineering readiness including explosive
ordnance disposal, and Prime BEEF forces, utilities to
include plant operation and purchase of commodity, refuse
collection and disposal to include recycling operations,
pavement clearance including snow and ice removal from
roads, and airfields, lease costs for installation real property
including off-base facilities, grounds maintenance and
landscaping, real property special inspections of facilities
and master planning, pest control, and custodial services.
Excludes sustainment, restoration, and modernization of
facilities, other environmental services (such as disposal of
hazardous materials), and mission-funded contingency
costs which are funded elsewhere. The title of this PE was
changed from Real Property Services.
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11978F Facilities
Sustainment Offensive

18538F Installation Law
Enforcement
Operations SAFs

Facilities Sustainment - Offensive: Facilities Sustainment.
Provides resources for maintenance and repair activities
necessary to keep facilities in the Departments real
property inventory in good working order. It includes
regularly scheduled adjustments and inspections,
preventive maintenance tasks, and emergency response and
service calls for minor repairs. It also includes major
repairs or replacement of facility components (usually
accomplished by contract) that are expected to occur
periodically throughout the life cycle of facilities. This
work includes regular roof replacement, refinishing of wall
surfaces, repairing and replacement of heating and cooling
systems, replacing tile and carpeting, and similar types of
work. It does not include certain restoration,
modernization, and environmental compliance costs which
are funded elsewhere. Other tasks associated with facilities
operations (such as custodial services, grass cutting,
landscaping, waste disposal, and the provision of central
utilities) are also not included. This program supports all
facilities reported in the real property inventory for which
the Facilities Sustainment Model provides a funding
requirement estimate, it excludes unreported facilities or
any other facilities for which the Facilities Sustainment
Model does not estimate a funding requirement.
Installation Law Enforcement Operations - SAFs: Includes
manpower authorizations, contracts, peculiar and support
equipment, and associated costs specifically identified and
measurable to plan, manage, coordinate, and execute
functions of Installation Law Enforcement (LE)
Operations. Installation LE Operations includes enforcing
federal, state and military law, enforcing installation
guidance, issuance of citations, detaining suspects, motor
vehicle traffic management, traffic investigations,
apprehension and restraint of offenders, and crowd control,
crime prevention, crime detection, LE patrols, LE liaison,
apprehension of persons who commit crimes on the
installation, testifying in prosecution cases and temporary
detention of offenders. This includes protecting, defending,
and deterring against criminal activities, conduct of minor
investigations, the development of plans for the
employment of law enforcement personnel, emergency
response, and management as it relates to law enforcement
activities and functions and which includes all processes
intended to preserve the principles of law through various
strategies. Excluded are the following functional
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categories: Facilities Operations (Real Property Services),
Facilities Sustainment, Facilities Restoration and
Modernization, and Facilities Demolition/Disposal, which
are reported under separate PEs.

18539F Physical Security
Protection
Service - SAFs

18542F Transportation
Logistics - SAFs

Physical Security Protection Service - SAFs: Includes
manpower authorizations, contracts, peculiar and support
equipment, and associated costs specifically identified and
measurable to plan, manage, coordinate, and execute
functions of Installation Physical Security Protection and
Services. This includes personnel, procedures and
equipment measures employed or designed to safeguard
personnel, facilities and property from loss, destruction,
espionage, terrorism, or sabotage on the installation,
prevent unauthorized access to
facilities/installations/restricted areas, equipment, and
materials. This includes regulation of people, material, and
vehicles entering or exiting a designated area, mobile and
static security activities for the protection of installation or
government assets, conduct of physical security
inspections/assessments, construction design review,
special protection of high value or sensitive property and
management of installation security systems, plans and
funding. Excluded are the following functional categories:
Facilities Operations (Real Property Services), Facilities
Sustainment, Facilities Restoration and Modernization, and
Facilities Demolition/Disposal, which are reported under
separate PEs.
Transportation Logistics - SAFs: Includes manpower
authorizations, contracts, peculiar and support equipment,
and associated costs specifically identified and measurable
to manage and administer the acquisition, dispatch,
operation (includes arranging for the movement of
passengers, cargo, and personal property), maintenance,
and disposal of all non-tactical government owned and
controlled vehicles and transportation related equipment
used for the day-to-day support of installation operations.
This includes, but is not limited to, vehicles (passenger
carrying, special purpose and general purpose) and
equipment such as railway equipment, portable generators
(not supplying facility back-up power), mobile cranes,
material-handling equipment, construction equipment, civil
engineering support equipment, contractual transportation
equipment, such as contractual bus services, vehicle
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18550F IT Services
Management Offensive

leasing, and other transportation services. This does not
include those vehicles and equipment used in direct
connection with or in support of combat or tactical
operations. This includes Installation Movement
operational activities to include deployment, sustainment
(resupply), redeployment, passenger services, passenger
terminal and cargo handling operations to include airfield
arrival/departure, personal property movement, Privately
Owned Vehicles (POVs), mobile homes, and movement of
freight. Excluded are the following functional categories:
Facilities Operations (Real Property Services), Facilities
Sustainment, Facilities Restoration and Modernization, and
Facilities Demolition/Disposal, which are reported under
separate PEs.
IT Services Management - Offensive: Includes manpower
authorizations, contracts, peculiar and support equipment,
and associated costs specifically identified and measurable
to plan, manage, coordinate, and execute Information
Technology Services Management (ITSM). Includes the
delivery of services consisting of secure and non-secure
fixed voice communications, wireless voice, data and video
connectivity services, video conferencing services
(excludes desktop video teleconferencing (VTC)
Collaboration). Provides infrastructure support, including
the design, installation, and maintenance of special
circuits/systems in support of life safety/security systems
and monitoring/control systems. Provides Collaboration
and Messaging Services including services and tools for
workforce to communicate and share information).
Provides Application and Web-hosting including operation
and management services required to support web and
application hosting. Provides for IT Operations Centers
including systems and processes necessary to allow
customers to have seamless access to IT applications and
solutions. Provides Desktop Management Support
including management and support for end-user hardware
and software services and tools. Includes Service Desk
Support, Continuity of Operations (COOP) and Disaster
Recovery support, requirements and training for commonuser software applications, Information Assurance, and
Multimedia/Visual Information. Provides printing,
publication, and duplication services. Excluded are the
following functional categories: Facilities Operations (Real
Property Services), Facilities Sustainment, Facilities
Restoration and Modernization, and Facilities
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Demolition/Disposal, which are reported under separate
PEs.

27588F Air Base Ground
Defense

87700F Defense Medical
Centers, Station
Hospitals &
Medical Clinics CONUS

Air Base Ground Defense: This program procures
equipment and provides for the sustainment of security
forces (CONUS, OCONUS, and in-place mobility)
assigned to detect and defeat various threats directed
against Air Force resources and personnel during
peacetime contingencies and execution of war plans. The
personnel and equipment provided by this program
contribute to the overall Air Force antiterrorism/force
protection program. It enhances security forces ability to
provide rapid responses by building more deployable,
flexible, and sustainable forces capable of operating from
other than main operating bases to support sustained sortie
generation and air operations. It directs the procurement of
advanced technology force multipliers to include: night
vision and thermal imagery equipment, counter
sniper/battery capabilities, ground weapons, target
acquisition radar, interoperable tactical communications,
wheeled tactical armored vehicles, tactical sensors systems
and unit/personnel protective field equipment. This
program protects and defends personnel and other critical
Air Force resources.
Defense Medical Centers, Hospitals, Medical Clinics CONUS - Includes manpower authorizations, peculiar and
support equipment, necessary facilities and the associated
costs specifically identified and measurable to the
following: Resources devoted to the provision of health
care in DOD-owned and operated CONUS facilities which
are staffed, and equipped to provide inpatient care for both
surgical and non-surgical conditions and/or outpatient care
for non-hospital type patients. Includes medical centers,
station hospitals, medical clinics, subordinate aid stations,
resource sharing and resource support agreements, federal
sharing agreements, medical center laboratories which are
integral to these facilities, alcohol abuse treatment
programs conducted at these facilities, clinical
investigations activities conducted at these activities, and
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32053F NMCS-wide
Support Communications

staff support for on-the-job training and education
programs conducted at these facilities. Excludes
supplemental care costs specifically identified and
measurable to health care services received in a nondefense facility as a result of a referral for authorized
beneficiaries of the military services. Excludes resources
associated with the operation of management headquarters
for regional lead agents, dental clinics, tactical medical
units (see appropriate elements in Programs 2 and 5) and
other health care resources devoted exclusively to teaching
(see appropriate elements in this program).
National Military Command System (NMCS)-Wide
Support - Communications: Includes manpower
authorizations, peculiar and support equipment, necessary
facilities and the associated costs specifically identified and
measurable to the following: Resources in support of the
National Military Command System as defined in DOD
Directive 5l05.19 necessary for support of the National
Military Command System as defined in DOD Directive
5105.19 necessary for support of multiple facilities of the
NMCS. This includes leased/government-owned circuitry
supporting the NMCS which interconnect multiple
facilities of the NMCS. This includes: ARMY: Automatic
Message Processing System (AMPS), Secure Data and
Visual Communication System (SDVCS), Washington
Area High Speed Facsimile Network (WASHFAX),
NMCC Message Center (NMCC/MCO), and dedicated
leased communications circuits and equipment for the
above. AIR FORCE: EMATS, MINUTEMAN, WHEEL
HOUSE, WASHINGTON SWITCH, CAOCOMNET,
JOTS, JCSAN, and JCCs. NEACP: Resources for
leased/government-owned circuitry, personnel, installation,
hardware improvement, construction and other activities
which interconnect the NEACP with multiple facilities of
the NMCS, agencies and command centers via ground
entry points. NMCC: Resources for leased circuitry
personnel, installations, hardware improvement,
construction and other activities which interconnect the
NMCC with the ANMCC and with communications
networks that in turn provide access to other command
centers and the Unified and Specified Commands. NAVY:
Resources to include leased/government-owned circuitry
supporting the NMCS which interconnect multiple
facilities of the NMCS, including digital, video, facsimile
teletype or voice related systems. Excludes all NMCS
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resources identified and reported in PEs 0302012A,
0302052F and 03034010.

63851F Intercontinental
Ballistic Missile
(ICBM) Demonstration/V
alidation

ICBM - DEM/VAL - Includes demonstration and
validation development efforts to support Minuteman
efforts focused on extending the service life of Minuteman
III through 2020, including replacing 1960 vintage
electronics in the guidance system and refurbishing
propulsion stages to correct age-related degradation and to
maintain reliability.
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Appendix F: AFCAIG Process (SAF/FMCC)
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Air Force Institute of Technology
Introd uction
This research analyzes the cost associated with the Minuteman III (lvW III)
weapon system The research develops three models for detennining MM III
cost s per alert hour(CPAH). The first model is based on the Air Force Cost
Analy sis Improvement Group cost per flying hour model. The model is modified
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